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SANTA CLARA LAWYER
upon the findings of a trial judge, they will be reversed only if they are
not based on substantial evidence.
Of all the factors which the trial court considers to determine whether
there has been a substantial change, the test which has evolved is whether,
in spite of all the changes, the property is still suitable for the purpose
for which the original restrictions were imposed.
Robert Rishwain*
CORPORATIONS: ATTORNEY'S EXPOSURE TO PERSONAL LIABILITY FOR
ACTIVE PARTICIPATION IN THE FORMATION OF A CORPORATION.
In Minton v. Caveney, a recent decision rendered by the Supreme
Court of California,1 a wide extension of the alter ego doctrine exposed
an attorney to personal liability in a tort action which had originally been
filed against a corporation
The Seminole Hot Springs Corporation was incorporated in March,
1954 for the purpose of conducting a public swimming pool business.
ThF corporation leased a swimming pool and opened for business. In
June, 1954 the plaintiff's daughter drowned in the pool. In a wrongful
death action against the corporation, the plaintiff was awarded a $10,000
judgment. The judgment went unsatisfied however, so plaintiff originated
the present action to have the court declare the defendant, Caveney, an
attorney who was a director and the secretary-treasurer of the corporation,
personally responsible for the judgment obtained against the corporation.
Caveney died during the proceedings and his estate was substituted as
the party defendant.
After the drowning, the corporation applied to the Commissioner of
Corporations for permission to issue three shares of stock, but permission
was refused until additional requested information was furnished. This
information was never supplied. Consequently a permit was never issued.
It was brought out at the trial that Caveney was to have received one
of these initial shares of stock, the remainder going to the other two
incorporators and directors.
Before his death Caveney related that the corporation did not have
any assets: that the corporation was organized but never functioned as
a corporation; that he had served in his official capacities as officer and
director more as an accomodation to his client (the corporation's presi-
dent) than for any other reason; and that he was serving in these
capacities with the understanding that he would not be an active director.
The trial court found the defendant liable for the sum of $10,000.
* Third year student, University of Santa Clara School of Law.
1 56 Adv. Cal. 597, 15 Cal.Rptr. 641 (1961).
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NOTES AND COMMENTS
In upholding the trial court's decision in principle, which had been re-
versed by the District Court of Appeals,2 the Supreme Court's opinion
reiterated three factors which traditionally have indicated an abuse of
the corporate privilege: (a) When the equitable owners treat the cor-
poration's assets as their own; (b) When they hold themselves out as
being personally liable for the debts of the corporation; (c) When they
provide inadequate capitalization and actively participate in the conduct
of the corporate affairs.- These considerations are among those frequently
cited by the California courts to establish a unity of ownership and
interest and to show that an inequitable result will follow if the corporate
entity is not disregarded, the two basic requirements for the application
of the alter ego doctrine in California.'
The Court made no effort to apply (a) or (b) above. But since there
was clear and undisputed evidence of inadequate capitalization and evi-
dence which was considered strong enough to support an "inference of
active participation," s the Court indicated that disregard of the corporate
entity would be justified. However, the court reversed the trial court on
the different ground that the issue of Caveney's negligence, as opposed
to the negligence of the corporation, had not yet been tried on the merits.
The previous finding of liability against the corporation could not be con-
sidered res judicata with respect to the individuals behind the corporation.
Since the corporation did not own its swimming pool, since it ap-
parently was not protected with adequate liability coverage, and since
the corporation had no "assets" by Caveney's own admission, there can
be little doubt that the corporation was undercapitalized. However, as
pointed out in the case of Automotriz Del Golfo De California S. A. De
C. V. v. Resnick, inadequate capitalization is not a conclusive test in
determining whether to disregard the corporate entity.6 Other facts are
also considered to support the ultimate determination. Here the Court
relied on active participation in the affairs of the corporation as a further
gauge. The whole opinion appears to hinge on this element, based on
the following evidence only:
The evidence is also undisputed that Caveney was not only the
secretary and treasurer of the corporation but was also a director.
The evidence that Caveney was to receive one-third of the
shares to be issued supports an inference that he was an equit-
able owner, and the evidence that for a time the records of the
2 Minton v. Kraft, 190 A.C.A. 311 (vac.), 12 Cal.Rptr. 86 (1961).
a Minton v. Caveney, supra note 1, 15 Cal.Rptr. at 643.
4 Minfle v. Rowley, 187 Cal. 481, 202 Pac. 673 (1921); Watson v. Commonwealth
Ins. Co., 8 Cal.2d 61, 63 P.2d 295 (1936); Automotriz Del Golfo De California S. A.
De C. V. v. Resnick, 47 Cal.2d 792, 306 P.2d 1 (1957).
5 Minton v. Caveney, supra note 3.
6 See note 4 supra.
7 Minton v. Caveney, supra note 3.
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corporation were kept in Caveney's office supports an inference
that he actively participated in the conduct of the business.
7
A brief, strong dissent questioned the wisdom of the majority opinion
in regarding the ordinary professional services of an attorney as active
participation in the affairs of a corporation:
I dissent from any implication that mere professional activity by
an attorney at law, as such, in the organization of a corporation.
can constitute any basis for a finding that the corporation is the
attorney's alter ego or that he is otherwise personally liable for
its debts, whether based on contract or tort. That in such circum-
stances an attorney does not incur any personal liability for
debts of the corporation remains true whether or not the at-
torney's professional services include the issuance to him of a
qualifying share of stock, the attendance at and participation in
an organization meeting or meetings, the holding and exercise for
such preliminary purposes in the course of his professional
services, of an office or offices, whether secretary or treasurer
or presiding officer or any combination of offices in the cor-
poration."
The dissenting opinion further pointed out that a corporation should
not be deemed to be carrying on business as a corporation until at least
qudlifying shares have been issued. Any acts and services performed
in organizing the corporation prior to this time could not be considered
the acts and services of a corporate being.9
.The objection of the dissent is to the "implication" that an attorney's
normal professional activities in the preliminary stages of a corporation's
existence are equated with actual participation in the conduct of the
corporation's business. This would effectively expose the attorney to
personal liability in the event that the corporate entity is disregarded.
The fear expressed seems genuine since the language in the majority
opinion is quite explicit:
It is immaterial whether or not he (Caveney) accepted the office
of director as an "accommodation" with the understanding that
he would not exercise any of the duties of a director. A person
may not in this manner divorce the responsibilities of a director
from the statutory duties and powers of that office. 10
This is extremely strong language. With no further explanatory or
qualifying remarks, this case would seem to indicate that the attorney's
normal jOrocedures in the organization of proposed corporations will make
him an active participant in the business affairs of such corporations
during the preliminary stages of their existence. It is now common practice
for the attorney to draft the by-laws, record the minutes of the first
meeting of the directors, open the corporations's bank account, and so
forth. It is not at all unusual for the corporation's attorney to maintain
8 Id.. 15 Cal.Rptr. at 645.
9 Ibid.
10 Id., 15 Cal. Rptr. at 644.
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all important documents relating to the incorporation in his own office
during this preliminary stage.
In view of the possible consequences which logically can be anticipated,
the majority opinion ought to be carefully examined to determine whether
the broad language used by the Court was justified by the facts of the
case and the authorities on which the Court relied.
The opinion cites several cases and treatises to support the ack-
knowledged rule that the corporate entity will be disregarded where
there is inadequate capitalization and active participation by the share-
holder in the corporation's affairs." These authorities all support one
phase of the general proposition or the other, but it is significant to note
that none of them extends the application of this rule to a situation in-
volving an attorney participating in the initial procedures of organizing
a corporation.
Furthermore, in most of the cited cases in which the corporate form
was ignored, the facts clearly indicated that the individual or individuals
behind the corporation were positively abusing the privilege of corporate
protection.12 This was not evident in the Minton case.
It is not seriously questioned that obvious abuse of a privilege afforded
by the state should be regarded as a forfeiture of that right by the
individual or individuals who utilize the corporate form as a shield against
personal liability. But it is questionable whether such an abuse was present
in the instant situation, and a fortiori, whether a general rule applicable
to any attorney who engages in the initial steps of a corporation's
organization can be rightfully derived from such a case.
The Court does not concern itself with a full factual review of
Caveney's position vis-a-vis the corporation. Yet their conclusion seems
to rely on inferences of fact, e.g., the inference that Caveney actively
participated in the corporation's business because he kept the records of
the corporation "for a time" in his office. Furthermore, the majority did
not find that Caveney exercised any control over the business of the
corporation, that he controlled the board of directors, that he commingled
his funds with the corporation's funds, that he ever hired or fired em-
11 Automotriz v. Resnick, supra note 4; Riddle v. Leuschner, 51 Cal.2d 574, 335 P.2d
107 (1959); Stark v. Coker, 20 Cal.2d 839, 129 P.2d 390 (1942); Shafford v. Otto Sales
Co., Inc., 149 Cal.App.2d 428, 308 P.2d 428 (1957); Carlesimo v. Schwebel, 87 Cal.
App.2d 482, 197 P.2d 167 (1948); BALLANTINE, CORPORATIONS 302-303 (rev. ed. 1946);
LATTIN, CORPORATIONS, 68-72; Fuller, The Incorporated Individual: A Study of the
One-Man Company, 51 HARV. L. REV. 1373.
12 These cases involve factual situations which indicate compounded abuse of the
corporate privilege. Typical of these situations is the dominant personality who manages
and controls the company and treats its assets as his own (Riddle, supra note 11);
undercapitalization and control of most of the stock (Stark, supra note 11); and public
reliance on the individual doing business rather than on the corporation, combined with




ployees of the corporation, or that he represented himself as the individual
engaged in the particular business.
If Caveney was merely pursuing his activities as an attorney when
he organized the corporation, when he agreed to serve as an "inactive
director," and when he agreed to maintain the documents relating to the
incorporation in his office "for a time," then the decision seems to be a
broad extension of the alter ego doctrine. If the Court is truly insistent,
as its language would indicate, that an attorney cannot "in this manner
divorce the responsibilities from the statutory duties of a director," 18 the
practitioner may have to adjust his ordinary professional practices
accordingly.
Eugene M. Premo*
* Third year student, University of Santa Clara School of Law.
33 Minton v. Caveney, supra note 3, 15 Cal. Rptr. at 644.
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